This RFC speci es an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB O cial Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Executive Summary
This document describes three types of service in support of Internet PrivacyEnhanced Mail (PEM) [1] [2] [3] : key certi cation, certi cate-revocation list (CRL) storage, and CRL retrieval. Such services are among those required of an RFC 1422 2] certi cation authority. Other services such as certi cate revocation and certi cate retrieval are left to the certi cation authority to de ne, although they may be based on the services described in this document. Each service involves an electronic-mail request and an electronic-mail reply. The request is either an RFC 1421 1] privacy-enhanced message or a message with a new syntax de ned in this document. The new syntax follows the general RFC 1421 syntax but has a di erent process type, thereby distinguishing it from ordinary privacy-enhanced messages. The reply is either an RFC 1421 privacyenhanced message, or an ordinary unstructured message. Replies that are privacy-enhanced messages can be processed like any other privacy-enhanced message, so that the new certi cate or the retrieved CRLs can be inserted into the requestor's database during normal privacy-enhanced mail processing. Certi cation authorities may also require non-electronic forms of request and may return non-electronic replies. It is expected that descriptions of such forms, which are outside the scope of this document, will be available through a certi cation authority's "information" service.
Overview of Services
This section describes the three services in general terms. The electronic-mail address to which requests are sent is left to the certi cation authority to specify. It is expected that certi cation authorities will advertise their addresses as part of an "information" service. Replies are sent to the address in the "Reply-To:" eld of the request, and if that eld is omitted, to the address in the "From:" eld.
Key Certi cation
The key-certi cation service signs a certi cate containing a speci ed subject name and public key. The service takes a certi cation request (see Section 3.1), signs a certi cate constructed from the request, and returns a certi cation reply (see Section 3.2) containing the new certi cate. The certi cation request speci es the requestor's subject name and public key in the form of a self-signed certi cate. The certi cation request contains two signatures, both computed with the requestor's private key:
1. The signature on the self-signed certi cate, having the cryptographic purpose of preventing a requestor from requesting a certi cate with another party's public key. (See Section 4.) 2. A signature on some encapsulated text, having the practical purpose of allowing the certi cation authority to construct an ordinary RFC 1421 privacy-enhanced message as a reply, with user-friendly encapsulated text.
(RFC 1421 does not provide for messages with certi cates but no encapsulated text; and the self-signed certi cate is not "user friendly" text.) The text should be something innocuous like "Hello world!" A requestor would typically send a certi cation request after generating a publickey/private-key pair, but may also do so after a change in the requestor's distinguished name. A certi cation authority signs a certi cate only if both signatures in the certi cation request are valid. The new certi cate contains the subject name and public key from the self-signed certi cate, and an issuer name, serial number, validity period, and signature algorithm of the certi cation authority's choice. (The validity period may be derived from the self-signed certi cate.) Following RFC 1422, the issuer may be any whose distinguished name is superior to the subject's distinguished name, typically the one closest to the subject. The certi cation authority signs the certi cate with the issuer's private key, then transforms the request into a reply containing the new certi cate (see Section 3.2 for details). The certi cation reply includes a certi cation path from the new certi cate to the RFC 1422 Internet certi cation authority. It may also include other certi cates such as cross-certi cates that the certi cation authority considers helpful to the requestor.
CRL Storage
The CRL storage service stores CRLs. The service takes a CRL-storage request (see Section 3.3) specifying the CRLs to be stored, stores the CRLs, and returns a CRL-storage reply (see Section 3.4) acknowledging the request. The certi cation authority stores a CRL only if its signature and certi cation path are valid, following concepts in RFC 1422 (Although a certi cation path is not required in a CRL-storage request, it may help the certi cation authority validate the CRL.)
CRL Retrieval
The CRL retrieval service retrieves the latest CRLs of speci ed certi cate issuers. The service takes a CRL-retrieval request (see Section 3.5), retrieves the latest CRLs the request speci es, and returns a CRL-retrieval reply (see Section 3.6) containing the CRLs. There may be more than one "latest" CRL for a given issuer, if that issuer has more than one public key (see RFC 1422 for details). The CRL-retrieval reply includes a certi cation path from each retrieved CRL to the RFC 1422 Internet certi cation authority. It may also include other certi cates such as cross-certi cates that the certi cation authority considers helpful to the requestor.
Syntax
This section describes the syntax of requests and replies for the three services, giving simple examples.
Certi cation Request
A certi cation request is an RFC 1421 MIC-ONLY or MIC-CLEAR privacyenhanced message containing a self-signed certi cate. There is only one signer.
The elds of the self-signed certi cate (which has type Certi cate, as in RFC 1422) are as follows:
{ version is 0 { serialNumber is arbitrary; the value 0 is suggested unless the certi cation authority speci es otherwise { signature is the algorithm by which the self-signed certi cate is signed; it need not be the same as the algorithm by which the requested certi cate is to be signed { issuer is the requestor's distinguished name { validity is arbitrary; the value with start and end both at 12:00am GMT, January 1, 1970, is suggested unless the certi cation authority speci es otherwise { subject is the requestor's distinguished name { subjectPublicKeyInfo is the requestor's public key The requestor's MIC encryption algorithm must be asymmetric (e.g., RSA) and the MIC algorithm must be keyless (e.g., RSA-MD2, not MAC), so that anyone can verify the signature. 
Certi cation Reply
A certi cation reply is an RFC 1421 MIC-ONLY or MIC-CLEAR privacy-enhanced message containing a new certi cate, its certi cation path to the RFC 1422 Internet certi cation authority, and possibly other certi cates. There is only one signer. The "MIC-Info:" eld and encapsulated text are taken directly from the certi cation request. The reply has the same process type (MIC-ONLY or MIC-CLEAR) as the request. Since the reply is an ordinary privacy-enhanced message, the new certi cate can be inserted into the requestor's database during normal privacy-enhanced mail processing. The requestor can forward the reply to other requestors to disseminate the certi cate. 
CRL-storage Reply
A CRL-storage reply is an ordinary message acknowledging the storage of CRLs. No particular syntax is speci ed.
CRL-retrieval Request
A CRL-retrieval request is a new type of privacy-enhanced message, distinguished from RFC 1421 privacy-enhanced messages by the process type CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST. The request has two or more encapsulated header elds: the required "Proc-Type:" eld and one or more "Issuer:" elds. The elds must appear in the order just described. There is no encapsulated text, so there is no blank line separating the elds from encapsulated text. Each "Issuer:" eld speci es an issuer whose latest CRL is to be retrieved. 
Security Considerations
The self-signed certi cate (Section 3.1) prevents a requestor from requesting a certi cate with another party's public key. Such an attack would give the requestor the minor ability to pretend to be the originator of any message signed by the other party. This attack is signi cant only if the requestor does not know the message being signed, and the signed part of the message does not identify the signer. The requestor would still not be able to decrypt messages intended for the other party, of course.
